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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
CKARON MERCEL HANDY,  
Appellant 
    
On appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 12-cr-00184-001) 
District Judge: Hon. Paul S. Diamond 
    
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 9, 2013 
 
BEFORE: McKEE, Chief Circuit Judge, FUENTES and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: June 5, 2014) 
  
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
  
 
McKee, Chief Judge 
 Ckaron Handy appeals the district court’s judgment of sentence, arguing that his 
right to allocution was violated, and that the district court erred in not appointing new 
  2 
counsel at the sentencing proceeding.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the 
district court.
1
 
 As we write only for the parties who are familiar with the facts and procedural 
history of this case, we need not reiterate them.  
I. 
Handy first contends that the district court did not honor his right of allocution. He 
bases this on, what he describes as, the district court’s “[quick] and [repeated]” 
interruptions of his attempted allocution.  Inasmuch as there was no objection at 
sentencing, we review this claim for plain error. See United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 
276, 278 (3d Cir. 2001). 
Although “not a right guaranteed by the Constitution,” FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 affords 
all defendants the right to allocute on their own behalf. United States v. Ward, 732 F.3d 
175, 181 (3d Cir. 2013). The right is “deeply rooted in our legal tradition,” as it predates 
the founding of our Republic. Id. at 180-81 (citing Adams, 252 F.3d at 282).  Pursuant to 
Rule 32, the sentencing court must address the defendant personally and permit the 
defendant to speak or present any information in mitigation of the sentence. FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii).  Here, the district court did both. 
                                                          
1
 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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Handy does not argue that the district court failed to address him personally. Nor 
could he.
2
 Rather, Handy argues that the right was violated because the district court 
“quickly and repeatedly interrupted” him.  His argument is based on United States v. Li, 
115 F.3d 125, 133 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the “sentencing judge's repeated 
interruptions . . . created an atmosphere that obviously rendered it difficult for [the 
defendant] to present an effective and potentially persuasive allocution” and thus 
warranted reversal).  However, that case is easily distinguished.  
Here, unlike in Li, the district court did not arbitrarily cut off or interrupt Handy. 
Rather, the court occasionally asked him to clarify some of his statements.
3
  Not only did 
the court not prevent Handy from speaking, the court twice asked Handy if he wanted to 
present anything further. He stated that he didn’t.  
Nor is there anything to suggest that Handy felt “intimidated” or “confused.” See 
Li, 115 F.3d at 133. In fact, prior to the interruption, Handy made was able to express all 
the points he now raises on appeal, albeit in a slightly different form.  
II. 
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 “THE COURT: Mr. Handy, you have the right to allocution. That means you have the 
right to speak to me in your own behalf and you may do so now, if you choose to [] 
exercise that right.” 
 
3
 For example, when Handy stated, “I feel as though he hasn’t represented me right the 
whole time [],” the Court responded, “[Defense Counsel]?”  The district court then asked 
for clarification as to what Handy’s attorney failed to do. 
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 Handy also asserts that the district court erred in conducting only a “barebones 
inquiry” into his dissatisfaction with his counsel and thereby violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. We review such challenges for an abuse of discretion. 
United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1098 (3d Cir. 1995).  It is difficult from 
Appellant’s Brief to determine if he is raising a Sixth Amendment issue of 
ineffectiveness, or a Sixth Amendment issue of denial of counsel because the court did 
not appoint substitute counsel when Handy expressed his dissatisfaction with the 
attorney representing him at the sentencing.
4
  
 It is true that, in considering last minute substitutions of counsel, we require 
district courts to inquire into the reason for the defendant’s dissatisfaction. See 
Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1098. As we noted in Welty, however, such substitutions require a 
preliminary showing of “good cause.” United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 188 (3d 
Cir. 1982).   We define “good cause” as a “conflict of interest, a complete breakdown of 
communication, or an irreconcilable conflict with the attorney.” Id. 
 Despite Handy’s claims to the contrary, the record reveals that the district court 
adequately discharged its responsibility to inquire into Handy’s dissatisfaction with 
counsel. The court asked Handy more than once to explain his dissatisfaction. When 
prompted about the underlying nature of his dissatisfaction, however, Handy provided no 
specific examples. In fact, it was only after the district court went so far as to suggest two 
                                                          
4
  To the extent that Handy is actually claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
purposes of the guilty plea representation, the claim should be raised in a collateral 
proceeding, not on direct appeal. See U.S. v. Frankenberry, 696 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1982). 
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different examples of ineffective assistance that Handy provided an arguably responsive 
answer.  However, Handy’s response suggests no more than mere tactical differences. 
United States v. Taylor, 652 F.3d 905, 908 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Thus, frustration with 
appointed counsel's performance or disagreement  with counsel's tactical decisions is not 
justifiable dissatisfaction.”). This record does not support an argument that there was a 
“complete breakdown of communication” or some other “irreconcilable conflict” 
between Handy and his attorney.  
 Moreover, the district court made sure that Handy was provided an attorney for 
his appeal based upon his last-minute complaints. Although his original attorney was 
allowed to withdraw, the district court directed the clerk’s office to file a notice of 
appeal on Handy’s behalf and instructed the government to monitor the docket to ensure 
new counsel was appointed.  Far from depriving Handy of  his Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel, we find that Judge Diamond’s handling of this sentencing was exemplary. 
III. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the district court.  
